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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1109
___________

ANIL DAVANAND POORAN; S.P.; CARROL SOOKNANAN POORAN,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A200-021-773, 774, 775)
Immigration Judge: Honorable R.K. Malloy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 25, 2011
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. AND GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 28, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
The Poorans (Anil, Carrol, and their daughter, Shenell) petition for review of a
final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying their motion to reopen
proceedings in which they had been denied asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). For the reasons discussed below, we will

deny the petition for review.
The Poorans, citizens of Trinidad and Tobago, entered the United States in 2000.
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security charged them with being removable
under section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B), as aliens who after admission as nonimmigrants remained in the United
States for a longer time than permitted.
The Poorans conceded that they were removable as charged. However, they
applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. They claimed that, while
they had not suffered past persecution, they feared future persecution due to their
membership in a particular social group, defined as Indo-Trinidadians who are perceived
as being wealthy because they have resided in the United States. After a hearing, an
Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all relief to the Poorans, who then appealed to the BIA.
On June 2, 2010, the BIA rejected their claims. The BIA concluded that while the
Poorans had presented evidence that kidnapping was a problem in Trinidad and Tobago,
they had not shown that individuals were targeted due to their race or membership in any
protected class. Instead, the BIA ruled, individuals were selected for kidnapping based
on their ability to pay a ransom, and the characteristic of having wealth, without
something more, was insufficient to make up a protected social group under the INA.
The BIA also concluded that the Poorans had failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of
future persecution because “the government is attempting to fight the criminal activity,
even calling the FBI for assistance, [their] family [has] never been bothered, there has
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only been one recent kidnapping in [their] home town, and [they are] not aware of anyone
who has been kidnapped after returning from the United States.”
On August 31, 2010, the Poorans filed a motion with the BIA seeking both
reopening and reconsideration. In the motion, the Poorans claimed that conditions in
Trinidad and Tobago had worsened. In support of this claim, they proffered four
newspaper articles, an unsworn statement from Ms. Pooran, and a Department of State
country report. On December 17, 2010, the BIA denied the motion for reconsideration as
untimely, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B), and denied the motion to reopen on the merits.1
The BIA concluded that the Poorans’ newly presented evidence, although emphasizing
that Trinidad and Tobago was dangerous, neither was material to their asylum claim nor
established a prima facie basis for relief. The Poorans then filed a petition for review in
this Court.
As an initial matter, we note that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s June 2,
2010 order of removal because the Poorans did not file a timely petition for review of that
order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (providing for 30-day deadline in which to file petition
for review); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 395 (1995) (motion to reopen or reconsider does
not toll time to file petition for review of BIA’s underlying removal order). The
government argues that we also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s December 17, 2010
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The Poorans have not challenged the BIA’s conclusion that the motion was
untimely insofar as it sought reconsideration. Nor have they presented any argument
concerning their withholding-of-removal or CAT claim. Accordingly, we will not
consider those issues.
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order in which it refused to reopen the case. However, contrary to the government’s
argument, we have long recognized that we possess jurisdiction to review orders denying
motions to reopen. See, e.g., Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2008);
see generally Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (“Federal-court review of
administrative decisions denying motions to reopen removal proceedings dates back to at
least 1916.”).
Although we will consider the BIA’s order on the merits, our standard of review is
narrow: we review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See
Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005). The BIA’s decision is entitled to
“broad deference,” Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted), and it “will not be disturbed unless [it is] found to be arbitrary,
irrational, or contrary to law,” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We agree with the government that the Poorans have failed to carry this heavy
burden. In support of their motion to reopen, the Poorans presented evidence concerning
two brutal attacks on fishermen in Trinidad and Tobago. While they contend that the
BIA “ignored” their new evidence, that is not correct; the BIA considered this evidence
and determined that it was neither material nor sufficient to establish a prima facie case
for relief. See generally Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding
that these are appropriate bases to deny reopening). More specifically, the BIA held that
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the Poorans’ evidence did not address the fundamental shortcoming in their asylum
request — that they had failed to show the required nexus between the risk of persecution
caused by the undisputedly high levels of crime in Trinidad and Tobago and their
membership in a protected class.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion. As the BIA
explained, the Poorans’ new evidence reinforced their earlier claim that Trinidad and
Tobago is beset by violence. However, the evidence did not suggest that the fishermen
were targeted due to their race or connection to the United States. Rather, as the BIA
concluded, the evidence does not provide any motive for the robberies beyond criminals’
typical desire to acquire wealth or property. Therefore, we discern no error in the BIA’s
conclusion that this evidence did not advance the Poorans’ asylum claim.2 See Abdille v.
Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that “random street violence” or
“ordinary criminal activity” that is “motivated not by animosity” against a particular
political position or social group, “but rather by arbitrary hostility or by a desire to reap
financial rewards. . . . does not rise to the level of persecution necessary to establish
eligibility for asylum”); see also Lopez-Castro v. Holder, 577 F.3d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir.

2

In their appellate brief, the Poorans claim that Mr. Pooran would work as a
fisherman if he returned to Trinidad and Tobago. However, during the hearing, Mr.
Pooran testified that “were he to return to Trinidad, he would continue working in a
factory as a forklift operator.” It was reasonable for the BIA to credit this testimony over
the conflicting statements that the Poorans have made in their subsequent filings. See,
e.g., Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007).
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2009) (explaining that “country-wide risk of victimization through economic terrorism”
is insufficient to sustain an asylum claim).
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.

6

